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The Situation in Mozambique: Short-Term Prospects

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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THE SITUATION
IN MOZAMBIQUE:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

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PREFACE

Mozambique, almost as much as Namibia and Angola, is a testing ground for US efforts to reduce conflict and Soviet-Cuban influence in southern Africa. Its internal problems have potentially serious implications for the region and beyond. Beset by a dangerous insurgency backed by South Africa, Mozambique seems to be faced with a choice between a *modus vivendi* with Pretoria or a greater Communist presence, possibly including Cuban combat troops.

This study examines the Machel regime's prospects over the next 12 months, South Africa's role in the conflict, as well as the possibility and consequences of a greater Soviet-Cuban role in Mozambique. The volatile nature of the situation and paucity of hard intelligence impose limits on our estimative capacity and the time frame of this paper. In any case, the next year is itself most critical and will shape events for many years to come.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The Machel regime, although beset with a dangerous insurgency and a deteriorating economy, can probably muddle through the next 12 months. The regime will maintain its critical military links with the USSR and Cuba, but will ask for direct combat assistance only if the security situation becomes more threatening or if South Africa appears ready to intervene openly. Instability will persist, however, with serious implications for the region and the West.

The approximately 12,000 guerrillas of the National Resistance of Mozambique (NRM) are operating in varying degrees in nine of the country's 10 provinces and have disrupted rail links and the oil pipeline to neighboring countries. The Mozambican Armed Forces continue to control the cities, although they have not been able to contain the NRM in the countryside. South Africa's support—in the form of arms, ammunition, general supplies, training, advisers, special action teams, and funding—has been instrumental in the NRM's growth. The NRM could continue to operate if Pretoria's assistance were reduced, but eventually at a lower level.

The NRM has yet to establish an effective political structure and cannot be said to have "liberated" any parts of Mozambique. As long as it remains heavily dependent on South Africa, the NRM will not be able to win either broad domestic or international recognition of its claim to power. The military situation is likely to remain at an impasse, barring a sudden and substantial increase in outside assistance for either side.

The insurgency is severely hurting the Mozambican economy, which had never recovered from the exodus of Portuguese residents at independence. The present dearth of skilled and semiskilled personnel and Machel's socialist policies have caused a decline in GDP of some 25 percent since independence. With debts of over \$500 million, serious consumer goods shortages, and declining production in key industries and agriculture, Mozambique's economic outlook is bleak.

The ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party has, in spite of a highly centralized system, made little progress in integrating and unifying the population. Nevertheless, FRELIMO's leadership appears for the most part united despite ethnic and ideological divisions and has the support of the military. FRELIMO's Marxist,

pro-Soviet orientation is not yet at issue, but recent overtures to the West and bilateral ministerial talks with South Africa suggest that a tactical shift, at least, is under way.

A sudden change in the leadership does not appear likely at this time, but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Such disruption would severely strain FRELIMO as its several factions struggled over the succession. We do not have sufficient information to make a definitive judgment about the outcome of such a struggle, but we do not believe that differences are so great as to fracture the government irrevocably or to cause sharp changes in FRELIMO's basic domestic or international policies.


The Soviet Union and Cuba could expand their already extensive web of military, political, and economic ties in Mozambique if the conflict worsens. Thus far, the USSR has responded to the deteriorating situation by providing more and better military hardware. The Soviets are likely to continue this tack, and may be considering an augmentation of their military advisory presence.

Should Maputo call for Cuban combat forces, a number of factors would figure in the Soviet and Cuban response: an assessment of the likelihood of success, Pretoria's probable response, financial costs, and the impact of a new Soviet-Cuban military intervention on Soviet initiatives on issues of greater importance to Moscow. The USSR would also consider the need to preserve its credibility with other Third World clients. On balance, we believe that Moscow and Havana would agree to send Cuban combat troops if they were deemed essential to preserve a pro-Soviet regime in Maputo. As a quid pro quo, the Soviets would probably press for privileges at Mozambican air and naval facilities.

South Africa would not passively accept a greater Communist military presence in Mozambique and would probably take action, possibly including direct attacks on Mozambican and Cuban forces. In the meantime, Pretoria will continue to try to force FRELIMO to rein in the African National Congress (ANC) and to wreck or severely limit the activities of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the regional development organization of black African states to which Mozambique belongs. Pretoria still has the option to try to overthrow the FRELIMO regime, but it does not want to be saddled with the defense of a shaky NRM-led regime and may be content merely to keep Mozambique weak and unstable, even while taking part in a dialogue with FRELIMO.

We do not believe the Machel regime will achieve a *modus vivendi* with South Africa or the NRM, nor will it achieve military victory over the next 12 months. But it will step up its efforts to press the West—especially the United States—for support against South African destabilization efforts while continuing to strengthen its military posture with Soviet help. If this two-pronged effort succeeds, Machel would probably reduce his reliance on the Soviets and Cubans and turn increasingly to the West to advance Mozambique's economic development. If, instead, the war heats up, he would be forced further into Moscow's arms, and Western opportunities to influence Mozambique and developments in the region would diminish.

Figure 1



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DISCUSSION

1. Mozambique occupies a critical strategic position in the volatile southern third of Africa (see figure 1), and events in the country have an impact on US efforts to play a constructive role in the region:

- The current insurgency threatens to embroil neighboring states in a regional conflict that has implications well beyond the area.
- Mozambique provides vital rail links to the sea for Zimbabwe and Malawi and is the focus of black African efforts to develop their economies and a transportation network under the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).¹
- It also borders the Mozambique Channel through which ships carrying Persian Gulf oil travel to Western Europe and the United States.
- The Soviet and Cuban military presence in Mozambique could increase sharply should the Machel regime be in peril of falling. As a price for increased support, the Soviets would probably ask for unrestricted air and naval access to Mozambican facilities.

2. Mozambique's recent overtures to the West, in quest of economic and military assistance and to put pressure on South Africa to limit support for the insurgency, offer the United States an opportunity to lessen tensions in the region and to head off an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa, even though the regime is unlikely to cut relations completely or to shed its Marxist orientation.

A Regime in Danger

The Insurgency

3. Two trends characterize the insurgency by the National Resistance of Mozambique (NRM) to date: the rapid growth in its size and capabilities and a

¹ Created in 1980 in an effort to lessen economic dependence on South Africa and promote regional development. Members are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

steady expansion of its area of operations.² Since 1980 when the NRM passed from the sponsorship of the former white-minority regime in Rhodesia into South African hands, its strength has jumped from some 2,500 to approximately 12,000 guerrillas, of whom some 6,000 to 8,000 are under arms.


4. The NRM, unlike most other insurgent movements, lacks a charismatic leader with a developed political program. Its appeal appears to be based on its opposition to the Marxist policies of the Machel regime and the material benefits it can offer its followers. The NRM has shown an ability to provide food for its forces and supporters, obtained either from South Africa or by raiding Mozambican convoys. This ability is significant in a country where malnutrition is widespread and where the government has promised much and delivered little.

5. The insurgency has gradually progressed from small-scale operations in 1977 to the point where NRM operations affect, in varying degrees, nine of the country's 10 provinces. From their original bases in central Mozambique, the insurgents have spread their operations north of the Zambezi and south of the Save Rivers, and from the western border to the coast. Thus far, only the province of Cabo Delgado in the far north has been unaffected, and even this may change. NRM activity in the south has extended, in at least one instance, to within 40 kilometers of Maputo, the capital. (See map on next page.)

6. The guerrillas have been able to win some popular support, particularly in Manica and Sofala

² Several small anti-FRELIMO groups merged in early 1977 to form the National Resistance of Mozambique. Included in these groups were conservative Mozambican whites who had fled when Machel took power, blacks from several small political parties that had refused to meld with FRELIMO, and some FRELIMO officials who had become disenchanted with Machel soon after independence in July 1975. The NRM, less than 100 strong at first, soon began receiving support from the Rhodesian military. NRM guerrillas in return served as guides inside Mozambique for Rhodesian troops operating against Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union. By the end of 1977, the NRM had begun launching small-scale hit-and-run attacks of its own on economic targets in central Mozambique.

Figure 2
Expansion of NRM Operations, January 1981-April 1983



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Provinces, which have been their traditional areas of operation and where they have tribal ties. (NRM President and military leader Afonso Jacama himself is the son of a tribal chief.) On the whole, however, tribalism has not been a critical factor in the insurgency. In areas where the NRM is able to operate with relative freedom, it has distributed food and other commodities—either provided by South Africa or stolen from local government stores. NRM guerrillas also have participated in cultivation of crops with local villagers. Recent eyewitness accounts also claim that the guerrillas have abandoned earlier efforts toward forced recruitment and other coercive measures against local populations, although such behavior persists.

7. In its military operations, the NRM has emphasized attacks on key economic targets, especially Mozambique's important and highly vulnerable lines of communication. NRM operations have disrupted the country's rail lines to Zimbabwe and Malawi, cut major highways, and damaged hydroelectric transmission lines and the Mozambique-Zimbabwe oil pipeline. Focusing on the communal village program, the NRM is regularly destroying these unpopular FRELIMO institutions. The guerrillas have relatively free movement over wide areas and have been able to tighten their hold in some central and southern regions, forcing the government in those areas to restrict road travel to escorted convoys.

8. On paper, NRM guerrillas are organized into battalions of 400 to 500 men. In reality, however, they operate in much smaller, highly mobile units in order to avoid detection. Their inventory includes such light weapons as AK-47 rifles, landmines, portable rocket launchers, and mortars, all of which are either provided by South Africa or captured from the Mozambican Armed Forces.

9. As the NRM has grown it has also become more confident. On several occasions it has attacked Mozambican units of equal size or larger and handled itself well. NRM guerrillas have held their positions under fire and, when outnumbered, have withdrawn in orderly fashion. On other occasions, they have attacked in waves, with some personnel reserved for evacuating the dead or wounded. Normally, however, the insurgents employ classic hit-and-run tactics, usually attacking undefended targets.

10. NRM leaders generally espouse anti-Communist and pro-Western views, although they may differ over basic ideologies and attitudes toward South Africa. The insurgents have stated that one of their major goals is to rid Mozambique of its Communist advisers, some of whom they have kidnaped or killed. In addition, in order to discourage West European countries from providing economic assistance to the Machel regime, the guerrillas last year began to kill and kidnap West European technicians.

11. Despite its expanded military activities and the recent appointment of a six-member "cabinet" in exile, the NRM has yet to develop an effective political wing that could move in behind the guerrillas, administer any "liberated" areas, and consolidate the movement's popular base.³ Until it does, and as long as it remains heavily dependent on South Africa, the NRM will not be able to win broad domestic or international recognition of its claim to power.

External Support

12. In its early years, the NRM was heavily dependent on the white regime in Rhodesia. The Rhodesians recruited guerrillas inside Mozambique and provided them with arms and other basic supplies, training, and radio equipment for broadcasting propaganda. Following Zimbabwe's independence under black majority rule, South Africa became the NRM's primary backer.

13. Pretoria's support—channeled through the South African military—has been instrumental in the NRM's growth. The South African armed forces provide:

- Small arms, ammunition, explosives, and infantry weapons such as light mortars and portable rocket launchers.
- General supplies such as food, clothing, and medicine.
- Basic and specialized training for NRM troops in the Transvaal and inside Mozambique.

³ Orlando Cristina, a white former Portuguese intelligence operative in Mozambique and second in command of the NRM as leader of its fledgling political organization, was murdered in South Africa in mid-April. Although details regarding his death were not immediately available, Mozambican agents may have been responsible.

- A small number of advisers posted inside Mozambique on an ad hoc basis to help direct and sometimes participate in military operations.
- Air drops and sea deliveries of supplies and weapons.
- A small transmitter, located in South Africa, for the insurgents' radio station, the Voice of Free Africa.
- Funding for the NRM's political wing.

Through its support of the NRM, South Africa has the greatest influence of any foreign power on the course of the struggle. Although at this stage the NRM would be capable of continuing the conflict even if South African assistance were sharply reduced, its level of operations eventually would decline markedly.

14. The NRM also receives financial support from private Portuguese sources, including those Portuguese who left Mozambique at independence and resettled in Portugal or South Africa.

Recently, the NRM

held a major organizing session in West Germany during March 1983.

The Economy

15. The insurgency and current impractical government policies are seriously hurting the fragile Mozambican economy. But the roots of Mozambique's economic difficulties are also traceable to the country's colonial heritage.

16. When independence was won from Portugal in 1975, the Portuguese-constructed transportation network was geared to regional needs and was grossly inadequate for domestic development. Transport services provided to neighboring countries, migrant labor in South African mines and on Zimbabwean farms, and a small tourist industry generated about two-thirds of GDP. The remainder of the economy emphasized fishing and export of raw materials and agricultural commodities. Cashew nuts, sugar, cotton, and small amounts of sisal, copra, and tea accounted for two-thirds of total exports. The small manufacturing sector

was oriented toward food processing, textiles, cement and other construction materials, machine components, and the output from a small oil refinery. As in most other African countries, subsistence agriculture provided the main livelihood for 80 to 90 percent of the population but accounted for only about 10 percent of the GDP.

17. The Portuguese monopolized the managerial, technical, and professional positions in Mozambique and occupied most of the skilled and semiskilled labor. Portugal also allowed Mozambique to accumulate overdue import payment obligations that reached as much as \$170 million in the early 1970s.

18. Mozambique's economic slide began when almost all of its Portuguese residents emigrated during and after the transition to independence and accelerated when Maputo enforced UN sanctions against Rhodesia from 1976—at a cost of \$550 million in rail and port transit fees, worker remittances, and tourism receipts. In addition, the economy has suffered from the government's socialist policies, including nationalization of abandoned landholdings, public services, most banks and many other enterprises, and poor management. The government also created large state farms and launched a campaign to communalize agriculture. As a result of all these factors, GDP fell an estimated 25 percent within the first few years of independence.

19. The economy has yet to recover. It is currently afflicted with a foreign debt of over \$500 million (most of it owed to official bilateral donors and to private suppliers in South Africa), low worker productivity and government mismanagement, declining agricultural production (necessitating the introduction of food rationing), serious drought, and transportation bottlenecks.

20. The discovery of commercially exploitable minerals, coal, oil, and natural gas offers significant opportunity for economic development, but exploitation will not reach fruition until at least the late 1980s. Mozambique could also benefit in time from its participation in SADCC. Because it has three of the six ports among the nine SADCC members, Mozambique is to be the focus of efforts to develop regional transport and communications. SADCC has proposed 96 transportation projects in Mozambique costing an estimated \$2.3 billion. Only about one-third of the needed funding

has been committed by foreign aid donors, however, and disbursements for transportation projects in Mozambique have been small. Moreover, the NRM's guerrilla campaign has disrupted SADCC's plans for Mozambique. Revitalization of the fishing industry, an important sector prior to independence, would offer the potential for major economic gain. In March 1983, Japan extended a \$2.2 million grant to develop the fishing industry, bringing total Japanese aid to Mozambique over the past five years to about \$6 million.

FRELIMO: In the Eye of the Storm

21. A year after the 1974 coup in Lisbon, Mozambique was granted independence under FRELIMO. FRELIMO, which had waged a guerrilla campaign lasting 10 years, portrays itself as an "organized vanguard of the working masses," following the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The highly centralized regime and its policies largely reflect the views of FRELIMO's president.

22. Before FRELIMO took power at independence its guerrillas had been operating primarily in the northern part of the country, which contains only 10 percent of the population. However, the new ruling party moved quickly to extend its authority and appointed a governor for each of the country's 10 provinces and administrators for the districts in each province. FRELIMO established local party cells around the country to politicize the population. It has repressed opposition groups and tribal authorities, and established reeducation centers to hold prisoners of all types, including counterrevolutionaries. Thousands reportedly have been detained in such centers.

23. Yet, FRELIMO's efforts at national integration and unification have not been particularly successful. For example, the regime has encountered considerable criticism from several northern ethnic groups—particularly the Maconde—over the dominant role of southerners in the central government. Other northern groups, such as the Macua, supported the Portuguese during the war of independence and probably remain highly distrustful of FRELIMO. Serious gaps have also been revealed in FRELIMO's program of social transformation. The government still has not enacted precise legislation for communal villages, nor has the relationship between state farms and cooperatives been spelled out.

The Party Hangs On

24. Despite the seemingly overwhelming problems confronting Mozambique, FRELIMO has shown surprising unity. But over the past few years, differences have developed among high-level officials primarily over the Soviet and Cuban role in combating the insurgency. While well-defined factions may not exist, several groups of officials seem to hold common views on key issues.

25. One group—probably the largest—is composed primarily of black nationalists in high party and government posts who want to avoid further dependence on Moscow in fighting the NRM. This group is led by Machel, Foreign Minister Chissano, and the Armed Forces Chief, Lt. Gen. Mabote, who argue that Mozambicans should continue to shoulder the bulk of the fighting. They appear to want to send home many of the approximately 500 Soviet and 800 Cuban military advisers, retaining only those necessary to fill technical positions. They are unlikely to do so, however, as long as the NRM problem persists. These officials have also made overtures to a variety of Western and nonaligned countries for military equipment and training.

26. Another loose grouping, comprised of senior technocrats, probably shares the nationalists' views. They are primarily concerned with getting the economy moving and have expressed dissatisfaction with the paltry economic aid provided by the Soviets and their allies. The most prominent member of the group is Planning Minister Machungo.

27. Opposing the nationalists' views is a small but influential grouping of radicals, dominated by mulattoes and whites, who want to expand Maputo's ties with the Soviets and to apply more doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist domestic programs. The leading members of this group are senior FRELIMO officials Marcelino dos Santos and Jorge Rebelo. They probably believe that an increased Communist military role offers the only way to overcome the insurgency.

28. A sudden change in the leadership does not appear likely at this time, but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Such a disruption would severely strain FRELIMO as its several factions struggled over the succession. We do not have sufficient information to make a definitive judgment about the outcome of such a struggle, but we do not believe that the differences

among them are so great as to fracture the government irrevocably or to cause sharp changes in FRELIMO's basic domestic or international posture.

FRELIMO and the Military

29. Maintaining the support of the armed forces is the key to Machel's retention of power. Among other things, he has:

- Appointed military officers to high-level party and government positions.
- Publicly assumed "direct command" of the war against the NRM, emphasizing his role as commander in chief.
- Provided military personnel with benefits unavailable to most Mozambicans.
- Furnished the armed forces with a sizable amount of military equipment obtained from the USSR and Eastern Europe.

30. Nevertheless, frustrations have been mounting within the armed forces, particularly at lower levels. The central command in Maputo is having increasing difficulty supplying troops in outlying areas with food, equipment, and arms, and payments of salaries are sporadic. Discontent and defections are well documented.

31. We lack direct evidence of anti-Machel sentiment at senior levels of the military. But [] sources report that the regime, which looks primarily to Communist countries for military training, has come under criticism by some officers who believe that this training has been largely ineffective.

The Army Versus the NRM

32. A large measure of the NRM's success can be attributed to the inadequacies of the Mozambican Army. The military currently numbers about 20,000; it lacks the manpower to contain the insurgents' wide-ranging operations. Despite a seemingly adequate population base, military conscription and recruitment have barely kept pace with desertions.

33. Mozambique's postindependence military has been organized and trained by the Soviet Union to become a modern, conventional force. The military

has been at a disadvantage in waging a counterinsurgency because of its conventional structure and the generally poor quality of the training received. The military's only real success against the NRM has occurred when major guerrilla units or bases have been surrounded and the military has been able to capitalize on the advantage provided by its heavier firepower. Such instances have been infrequent.

34. In the past six months the Army has begun to show a degree of flexibility and an ability to adopt new strategy. It has decentralized its command structure so that many tactical decisions can be taken at the provincial level. The military has reportedly been successful in some instances against the guerrillas in recent fighting by adopting basic counterinsurgency tactics such as small unit patrols, carefully laid ambushes, and search-and-destroy operations. Another development has been the upgrading of a national militia for local defense. It has also expanded aerial reconnaissance in sparsely populated parts of the country.

35. Thus, the military situation is currently at an impasse. Although the Army cannot contain the guerrillas in the countryside, it retains control of the cities.

36. Machel, dissatisfied with the quality of Soviet assistance and apparently hoping to lessen Mozambique's dependence on Moscow, took a number of steps in 1982 to diversify the sources of the military's foreign support. His government has approached the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Brazil, Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of China, Tanzania, and North Korea for assistance. Since last November, three battalions of Zimbabwean troops—some 2,000 to 3,000 men—have been sent to Mozambique to help defend rail, road, and pipeline installations on which Zimbabwe is dependent. Portugal has agreed to a modest military assistance package, Yugoslavia and the PRC are reported to be sending small arms, and Libya reportedly delivered some small arms in February. North Korean and Tanzanian advisers have already arrived in the country. Whether this diverse mix of equipment and advisers will have a significant impact is questionable. In any event, the Mozambicans will continue for the foreseeable future to be heavily dependent on the Soviets for arms.

The Soviet Role

37. Soviet objectives in Mozambique generally parallel Moscow's regional goals in southern Africa. These include:

- Expanding the Soviet presence and access and offsetting US/Western and Chinese efforts to undermine Moscow's position.
- Promoting leftist change and consolidating pro-Soviet regimes.

Mozambique is also important to Moscow's longer term objective of fomenting instability in South Africa. The Soviets currently use Mozambique as a conduit for arms and other assistance provided to the guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC), which operates against South Africa. The USSR also values Mozambique as a Third World country that has embarked on the path of socialist development and consequently as tangible evidence of Moscow's contention that the world "correlation of forces" is shifting in its favor.

38. The USSR and its allies have established a web of military, political, and economic ties with the Machel government. Mozambique has signed friendship treaties with the USSR (1977), Cuba (1977), Bulgaria (1978), East Germany (1979), and Romania (1979). Most of these treaties contain clauses calling for consultations in times of trouble.

39. Military assistance is the cornerstone of the Soviet-Mozambican relationship, and has become even more important in view of the growing insurgency. The 500 Soviet advisers working with the Mozambican Armed Forces (MAF) are directly involved in planning, training, and logistics functions from the General Staff to the brigade level. Military consultations between high-level Soviet and Mozambican officials have increased over the past year. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mabote and Secretary for Economic Planning dos Santos visited the USSR in May 1982. General Yepishev, chief political commissar of the Soviet armed forces, toured Mozambique in late May and early June. Machel met with top Soviet military officials during his November visit to Moscow for Brezhnev's funeral, and subsequently a number of high-ranking Soviet officers, including the head of the military's 10th main directorate—responsible for foreign military assistance—visited Maputo in December.

In March 1983, Machel (accompanied by Mabote, Planning Minister Machungo, and FRELIMO Security Chief Minister Vieira) consulted with Soviet leader Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and other high-level officials in Moscow and East Berlin.

40. This series of consultations suggests that a broad range of future options was discussed. The Soviets no doubt sought to assess the general situation in Mozambique before committing themselves to new levels of aid.

41. New shipments of Soviet arms have arrived since mid-1982. In July, for example, Soviet arms carriers delivered T-54 tanks, artillery pieces, support vehicles, and late-model BMP infantry fighting vehicles. In October, Soviet armored personnel carriers, as well as other military equipment, also arrived in Mozambique, and in December the Soviets reportedly delivered another 60 T-54 tanks. Between 1975 and 1982 the Soviets and their allies delivered at least \$380 million in military equipment.

42. The Soviets' East European allies have supplemented Soviet military assistance efforts. The German Democratic Republic has delivered \$52 million in military equipment, with Hungary second, delivering over \$30 million in equipment. Both countries sponsor military training for MAF personnel. Additionally, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have contributed \$12 million in equipment, mostly light artillery and small arms. A vital adjunct to this effort has been the presence of 150 to 200 East German advisers in Mozambique conducting training for police and security service personnel, with emphasis on signal security and communications. Over the past few months, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have signed new arms agreements with Maputo.

Political and Economic Ties

43. Meanwhile, the Soviets and East Europeans have been developing extensive party-to-party ties with FRELIMO, sharing their organizational and ideological expertise with the regime in an effort to strengthen pro-Soviet elements within the government. A program for interparty contacts between the CPSU and FRELIMO was signed during a party delegation visit to Moscow in September 1982. The Soviets reportedly also presented a plan last year to the Maputo government to streamline the decisionmaking

process within the regime and facilitate implementation of military action against the NRM. This plan allegedly calls for restructuring the civil service and creating a centralized policymaking body that would include Soviet and Cuban advisers. The plan does not appear to have been implemented.

44. Although the Soviets and East Europeans have concluded accords with Maputo in fields such as agriculture, education, fishing, geology, health, and housing, economic assistance remains a perennial source of bilateral friction. Moscow thus far has not provided the degree of economic support Mozambique seeks, and Maputo's application for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) has been quietly ignored. Machel may have been alluding to Soviet tightfistedness during his March visit to Moscow, calling upon the "international community" to ensure the independence of free African states from Pretoria "within the framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference"—a body to which Moscow has made no financial pledges.

45. Mozambican officials appear to have concluded that Mozambique will not receive substantially more Soviet economic assistance and must look elsewhere. As a result, they have been making efforts in recent years to expand economic ties with the West. Moscow probably is less concerned over Mozambique's development of economic relations with the West than it is over Western military ties. Despite Moscow's close involvement with the Mozambican military, Soviet officials have expressed disapproval of Maputo's arms deal with Portugal in 1982; they apparently fear that continued efforts to obtain Western military assistance could gradually undermine Soviet influence in Mozambique.

Cuban Assistance to Mozambique

46. Cuba also has played a vital role in efforts to bolster Machel. Having developed a close personal friendship, Castro and Machel have exchanged visits. Cuban Political Bureau member Jorge Risquet, who had previously been in charge of Cuban military and civilian personnel in Angola, led delegations to Mozambique in January and in September-October of 1982. Senior Cuban military officers were with him on both occasions. Machel visited Havana in May 1982.

47. Cuban economic aid to Mozambique began modestly in 1976 with technical assistance in the livestock field and has expanded to include cooperation in public health, education, fishing, mining, agriculture, communications, and transportation. The Cuban civilian presence reached 1,000 during 1981 and remains at about that level. We believe Mozambique pays Cuba for at least some of the assistance, but we have no information on the amount or method of payment.

48. In addition to the aid provided in Mozambique by Cuban personnel, there are now about 2,400 Mozambican students on the Isle of Youth and a few hundred more in Cuban universities and technical schools. Altogether the Cubans claim to have trained 4,000 Mozambicans.

49. In the security field, intelligence officers from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior (MININT) are part of President Machel's bodyguard and personal staff. MININT advisers are also involved in training police in embassy protection, internal security, and police investigative work. They work with the Mozambican Ministry of Security down to the provincial directorate level.

50. Mozambique and Cuba have concluded a number of formal agreements, including a 20-year Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Agreement, signed in 1977. Machel signed a commercial agreement while in Cuba last May, and accords exist between the two Foreign Ministries and the Cuban Communist Party and FRELIMO. Although last August the Cuban Ambassador to Mozambique referred to a mutual defense pact, we have no other indication that a formal military assistance treaty exists. Havana does, as noted, provide about 800 military advisers who are mainly involved in training and logistic functions.⁴

The West

51. FRELIMO is broadening its ties with Western nations and is seeking military and economic assistance in an effort to contain the NRM insurgency and arrest the economic decline. Mozambique has so far

made the most headway with its former colonial ruler, Portugal, with which relations had been cool after independence in 1975. A warming trend began in the late 1970s and accelerated with the visit of Portuguese President Eanes to Mozambique in the fall of 1981. In April 1982 the two countries signed a modest military agreement calling for Portuguese provision of light arms, equipment, and counterinsurgency training. During Prime Minister Balsemao's visit to Maputo last June, Portugal agreed to finance the salaries of its aid technicians in Mozambique, to assist in the rebuilding of the Nacala-Malawi railway, and to help create a joint fisheries operation. Balsemao also declared Portugal's support for Mozambique in its confrontation with South Africa and condemned the insurgency.

52. Linguistic and cultural ties contribute to rapprochement between Lisbon and Maputo. Several thousand Portuguese still reside in Mozambique, and Maputo and Lisbon seem eager to have former residents return to Mozambique. Maputo needs the expertise they would bring, and Lisbon would like to regain its influence and augment its trade ties with Mozambique.

53. While Lisbon may officially support FRELIMO, the NRM appears to have its own Portuguese connection. The insurgents maintain an office in Lisbon, and certain members of the Portuguese armed forces reportedly have arranged for several NRM leaders to receive training in Portugal. Some elements in Portugal appear to be hedging against a possible NRM victory in Mozambique.

54. Financially strapped Portugal cannot ameliorate Mozambique's economic difficulties, however, and FRELIMO has courted other Western countries. In July 1982 Mozambique signed the "Berlin Clause," making itself eligible for entry to the Lome Convention, and was immediately rewarded with 3,000 tons of West German corn. More recently, West Germany agreed to provide short-term credits of \$27 million.

55. Finally, the Machel regime has signaled its interest in improving relations with Washington. In addition to seeking US economic aid and investment, Mozambique clearly wants the United States to intercede with Pretoria and press the Botha government to ease its support of the NRM. The United States has initiated a high-level dialogue with the Mozambicans to explore the possibilities of improving bilateral relations.

Relations With South Africa

56. Mozambican-South African relations are anomalous. The two countries are enmeshed in mutually beneficial economic relationships, but at the same time each supports violent action against the other. In December 1982, Mozambican and South African officials met inside South Africa in order to open a dialogue.

57. Since independence, FRELIMO has supported the African National Congress (ANC) whose guerrillas conduct sabotage and terrorist raids in South Africa. But the Mozambicans claim to have shut down all ANC training facilities in their country, because of pressure from the South Africans. The ANC, however, still moves refugees and recruits out of South Africa through Mozambique and continues to infiltrate cadre into South Africa from Mozambique through Swaziland.

58. In May 1980, Pretoria began supporting the NRM in retaliation for Machel's support of the ANC, and has itself launched commando raids against ANC targets inside Mozambique. The South Africans appear to be pursuing three objectives in supporting the NRM:

- To force FRELIMO to rein in the ANC.
- To wreck the plans of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to lessen its members' dependence on Pretoria.
- To keep Mozambique unstable and perhaps ultimately to overthrow the FRELIMO regime.

59. In addition to retaliation, the NRM serves Pretoria's interests by targeting Mozambique's transportation routes, such as the Beira-Malawi railroad and the Beira-Zimbabwe rail and oil lines that the SADCC plans to rehabilitate. These actions appear to be aimed as much at Zimbabwe as at Mozambique. The only real alternative for the African nations dependent on Mozambique's rail systems is to route their trade through South Africa. With Mozambique's transportation routes seriously disrupted, SADCC has been dealt a serious blow.

60. Mozambique may well be South Africa's primary target for destabilization in southern Africa. In South African eyes a Soviet-armed and united Mozambique would pose a clear strategic threat because of

the two countries' common border, but it is not clear how far Pretoria itself is prepared to go to subvert Machel. Pretoria may not want the NRM to come to power in Mozambique at the present time since the insurgents have yet to create the political structure necessary to govern the country on their own. Continued turbulence in Mozambique, perhaps necessitating an SADF presence there as well as a substantial aid commitment, would be the probable result if the NRM seizes power in the near term.

61. The NRM includes nationalist elements who wish to establish a new government in Mozambique without South African backing. This appears to have resulted in periodic strains between the NRM and the South Africans and to have created doubts in Pretoria that the NRM would be a reliable ally if it comes to power. Pretoria may feel that its best interests for now lie in having the NRM fight FRELIMO to a standstill without having the insurgents come to power.

62. From time to time, the South Africans themselves concentrate forces on the Mozambican border to interdict ANC infiltration, stretch Mozambican Army units that might otherwise be fighting the NRM, or simply to engage in psychological warfare. The SADF also has carried out commando raids against targets in Mozambique such as ANC "safe houses" in Matola (January 1981), the Pungoe River bridge (October 1981), and Beira harbor (November 1981) and refinery (December 1982).

Outlook

63. While the Machel regime will remain imperiled, it probably can continue to muddle through the military impasse and economic crisis through the next 12 months. But its options will remain limited. Prospects for a *modus vivendi* with South Africa or the NRM are slim because Machel is unlikely to reduce Mozambique's ties significantly with the ANC and the Communist world, or to reorient his regime's ideological outlook. But a hardening of Mozambique's stance against South Africa and the insurgents would require a much greater Soviet and Cuban military presence, risking South African armed incursions.

64. In the absence of some abatement in the insurgency, economic recovery is highly unlikely. Indeed, the outlook is for further deterioration.

65. The regime's policy at this time would appear to be a two-track approach: to strengthen Mozambique's military posture vis-a-vis the NRM while, with Western support, trying to conduct a dialogue with South Africa. Thus, Machel has sought increased Communist and Western military assistance, undertaken new offensives against the NRM, and attempted to discourage popular support for the insurgents by conducting public executions of some captured guerrillas and alleged civilian sympathizers. At the same time, Mozambican ministers have met with the South Africans to discuss their differences and hope to hold further meetings. Meanwhile, dialogue with the West—particularly the United States—continues.

The Cubans Considered . . .

66. Should this policy fail and the situation deteriorate to the point that Machel believes he will fall, he will probably request the assistance of Cuban combat troops. There are indications that consideration has been given to that option:

- Throughout 1982 there were exchanges of visits involving high-level Cuban, Soviet, and Mozambican officials concerned with military matters.
- Last fall Machel told Western diplomats in Maputo that Mozambique was being pressured by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Cuba to accept Communist troops to protect Soviet Bloc economic advisers from guerrilla attacks.
- Since the spring of 1982 the Soviets have made at least three deliveries of heavy military equipment to Mozambique, including top-of-the-line BMP infantry fighting vehicles, which have been used by Cubans in Ethiopia and have been seen in Angola.

— The Soviets have demonstrated the capability to mount a large-scale air and sealoift to Mozambique as they did in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1978. They could bring in several thousand Cuban troops and their equipment within a few weeks of a decision to do so.

... and Reconsidered

67. Other factors suggest that Machel does not now intend to request Cuban combat troops and hopes to avoid doing so. While hard pressed, the regime is not on the verge of being toppled by the NRM.

68. Machel knows that Cuban intervention would scuttle his efforts at rapprochement with the West. Foreign Minister Chissano told [redacted] that Mozambique would not request Cuban combat forces unless South Africa invaded.

69. Machel is well aware of the probable South African response to Cuban intervention in Mozambique. Pretoria has warned that it would not tolerate the presence of Cuban combat forces there. The South Africans would probably escalate the violence against Mozambique—possibly to include a direct attack—if large numbers of Cuban troops intervene.

70. Financial considerations, too, could be a restraining factor. Mozambique, unlike Angola, is not a major exporter of oil and lacks foreign exchange to pay for Cuban forces. Indeed, it is unable to pay for the Soviet military aid it already receives. The Soviets almost certainly recognize, therefore, that they would have to underwrite the costs of deploying Cuban forces.

71. Finally, Machel is essentially an African nationalist who seems convinced that his own guerrilla campaign won Mozambique's independence and that only Mozambicans should defend it. He has seen that Cuban intervention in Angola has not defeated the UNITA guerrillas (although the Cubans are keeping the MPLA regime in power), and he cannot assume that Cubans would be able to defeat the NRM or fend off the South Africans.

72. On balance, Machel does not need to call for Cuban troops to save his regime at the present time. If the South Africans sharply increase their assistance to the NRM or appear to be preparing to move directly

against Mozambique, Machel would face a new situation and might finally call for Cuban troops. On the other hand, if there is no drastic change in the level of insurgent activity or South African intervention, the Communist countries continue to provide arms, his neighbors furnish modest combat and training support, and the West holds out a promise of economic assistance and political pressure on South Africa, Machel probably will play out these options before turning to the Cubans.

73. We have no clear indication of Soviet or Cuban intentions at present to commit Cuban combat forces. Neither Moscow nor Havana wishes to get embroiled in a war against South Africa or another open-ended antiguerrilla struggle. Thus far, Moscow has responded to the worsening situation by providing more and better military hardware. The Soviets are likely to continue this tack, and may be considering an augmentation of their military advisory presence. If convinced that the FRELIMO government could only be preserved by the dispatch of a Cuban combat force, Moscow would have to weigh the importance of demonstrating its commitment to Third World clients against the potential damage to its current "peace offensive" and its attempt to undercut Washington's call for increased defense spending. Moscow would also have to consider the impact of such moves on Pretoria, which has clearly stated that it would not countenance a Cuban troop presence in Mozambique. A strong South African military response would force Moscow and Havana to choose between escalation or an embarrassing retreat. On balance, we believe that Moscow and Havana, if asked, would agree to send Cuban combat troops—probably in considerable numbers.

Implications for the United States

74. A continued military impasse over the next 12 months would allow time for the improvement of Mozambican-Western relations. While improved ties will not bring an end to the insurgency or other conflicts in the regime, the United States would have greater opportunities to influence developments than it has had previously.

75. Although Machel's tentative opening to the West does not ensure a shift from socialism or of Mozambique's close relations with the Soviets, it could soften both and lead to greater flexibility and pragmatism in

Maputo. In order for Machel to demonstrate the soundness of his policy to hardliners in FRELIMO, however, he will need tangible benefits, such as successful US and other Western pressure on Pretoria to back off and badly needed economic assistance.

76. Over the long term, continued conflict in Mozambique carries with it substantial risks of South African-Cuban confrontation, expansion of the conflict beyond Mozambique's borders—for example, by drawing Zimbabwe more deeply into the situation—and, in consequence, diminishing opportunities for Western influence or conciliation.

77. An increased Soviet presence in Mozambique, possibly including naval access rights, would make it easier for the Soviets to support extended naval deployments in the event of crises in the Indian Ocean.

78. Should the Machel regime ultimately fall, other black southern African states would conclude that Washington either cannot influence Pretoria or actually favors South African destabilization of its neighbors. However much they distrust the Soviets, they might have little choice but to turn to Moscow to support them against South African military aggression.

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